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The ambient tax is often considered as an eﬃcient instrument to
achieve a ﬁrst best outcome of ambient pollution when the regulator is
less informed than the polluters. Since the ambient tax was never imple-
mented in the ﬁeld, empirical evidence is missing. Available experimental
ﬁndings provide mixed evidence: eﬃciency is higher under external dam-
age, i.e. if ambient pollution aﬀects non-polluters (Spraggon, 2002, 2003)
than under internal damage, i.e. if ambient pollution aﬀects polluters
themselves (Cochard et al., 2005). Since these two types of experiments
relied on very diﬀerent designs, it is worthwhile to compare them under a
common experimental design. Our main ﬁnding is that the ambient tax
is equally eﬃcient under external damage than under internal damage.
Key-words : ambient tax, eﬃciency, endogenous externality, exogenous
externality, experimental economics, non-point source pollution.
1 Introduction
When emissions are related to well-identiﬁed sources the regulator can imple-
ment traditional environmental policy instruments such as standards, emission
taxes or pollution permits. Under non-point source pollution however, these
policy instruments are no longer applicable and eﬀective. While polluters know
precisely their emission levels, the regulator has only limited information about
individual emissions. Often he can only measure the level of ambient pollution
but has no reliable measure of individual sources of emissions. Alternatively
the cost of measuring or monitoring individual emissions might be prohibitive.
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1However, even if individual emissions cannot be precisely assessed, the regulator
has often a clear assessment of the social cost of the ambient pollution. There-
fore the optimum level of ambient pollution can still be deﬁned, a necessary
condition for designing eﬃcient instruments to reach a socially optimum level
of emissions.
One such instrument, the ambient tax/subsidy, was proposed by Segerson
(1988). The ambient tax/subsidy implements a collective penalty for each po-
tential polluter whenever the ambient pollution is beyond the target level. If
ambient pollution is below the target each potential polluter receives a subsidy.
More precisely each potential polluter has to pay a ﬁne (receives a subsidy)
proportional to the excess (shortfall) of ambient pollution with respect to the
target level. It can be shown that whenever the marginal tax rate is equal to
the marginal damage of the ambient pollution the socially optimal level of am-
bient pollution equals the unique Nash equilibrium of the emission game. The
eﬀectiveness of the ambient tax has been demonstrated by Segerson (1988),
Shortle et al. (1998), Shortle and Horan (2001) and investigated experimentally
by Spraggon (2002, 2003), Cochard et al. (2005) and Giordana and Willinger
(2008). Hansen (1988) proposed an asymmetric version of the instrument, the
ambient tax, for which the subsidy part is ommitted. In contast to the ambient
tax/subsidy which allows for the possibility that the polluters collude in order
to beneﬁt from a subsidy the asymmetric instrument is collusion proof.
Experimental ﬁndings showed mixed evidence about the eﬃciency of the
ambient tax/subsidy scheme proposed by Segerson (1988). While Spraggon
(2002, 2003) found that the ambient tax/subsidy instrument is highly eﬃ-
cient (91.34%), Cochard et al.’s (2005) experiment showed that the ambient
tax/subsidy instrument is rather ineﬃcient (-41.38%) when the ambient pollu-
tion aﬀects the polluters themselves. However they also found that an asymmet-
ric ambient tax instrument (without the subsidy part as in Hansen, 1998) allows
to reach a high level of eﬃciency (80.08%) even if ambient pollution aﬀects the
polluters themselves. Still, the ambient tax instrument is much less eﬃcient
when the externality aﬀects the polluters themselves (Cochard et al.,2005) than
when the victims are disjoint from the polluters (Spraggon, 2002, 2003).
There are notable diﬀerences between these two experiments that may ac-
count for the observed divergence : group size, proﬁt functions, strategy sets,
number of rounds, etc... The most important diﬀerence between the two ex-
periments is the existence of a strategic interaction among players before the
implementation of the policy-instrument. In the experiment by Cochard et al.’s
(2005) players’ decisions generate a negative externality upon themselves: each
polluter’s decision aﬀects both other polluters’ well-being as well as his own
well-being. Because of that, polluters are engaged in a strategic interaction even
if no policy instrument is implemented. In contrast in Spraggon’s experiment
such interaction does not exist because the externality aﬀects only agents that
2are not members of the group of polluters. The strategic interaction among
players is introduced only by way of the policy instrument. In Cochard et al.’s
experiment the instrument creates an additional strategic link among players.
The eﬃciency of the ambient tax may therefore be aﬀected by the pre-existing
strategic interaction among players without any policy instrument.
We design an experiment that varies the nature of the damage - external
versus internal - keeping everything else constant. Under standard behavioral
hypotheses, the underlying game-theoretic model predicts that the ambient tax
is equally eﬃcient under internal than under external damage. Our main ﬁnd-
ing is that the ambient tax is equally eﬃcient and equally reliable under both
externality regimes. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
2 provides the theoretical background and section 3 describes the experimental
design. In section 4 we discuss our main ﬁndings and section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical background
In this section we introduce a simple model that predicts the outcome of the
emission game under external and internal damage. The main objective of this
model is to determine a parametric version for which we predict the same out-
come under both externality regimes.
We consider n identical ﬁrms producing a homogeneous product with a single
input x. xi ,i = 1,...,n is the amount of input used by ﬁrm i, with xi ≥ 0. We
assume that ﬁrms are price-takers both on input and output markets. The proﬁt
of ﬁrm i is a function of input use both under internal and external damage. In




πi(xi) under external damage
πi(xi,e) under internal damage
￿
We assume that πi is strictly increasing and concave in xi and strictly de-
creasing in e. We consider the case where ambient pollution depends only on
input use. Furthermore, to simplify subjects’ task in the experiment we assume
that individual emissions ei ,i = 1,...,n, are such that ei = xi ,for all i. Finally








The level of ambient pollution generates a damage on the economy that is
measured by an external cost c(e). We are interested in two particular cases :
one where the damage aﬀects only agents that are outside of the polluting sector
(external damage), and one where the damage aﬀects only agents that are inside
the polluting sector, i.e. the polluting ﬁrms themselves (internal damage). We
assume that c(e) = δe, δ > 0, where δ is the marginal damage from emissions.
The level of emissions chosen by ﬁrms under laissez-faire, typically diﬀers
from the socially optimum level of emissions. Under laissez-faire each ﬁrm
3chooses the level of input use that maximizes it’s proﬁt, ignoring the externality
imposed on other agents. In contrast at the social optimum the level of input
use by each ﬁrm should equalize the ﬁrm’s marginal beneﬁt to the marginal
social cost. With our assumptions the socially optimum emission level (e∗) is
below the equilibrium level of emissions (b e). We now compare the two contexts
: internal and extenal damage.
2.1 Internal damage
2.1.1 Ambient pollution under laissez-faire
Let the proﬁt of ﬁrm i be deﬁned as :
πi(xi,e) = f(xi)−c(e) = f(xi)−δe = g(xi)−δe−i, with g(xi) = f(xi)−δei.
f(xi) is ﬁrm i’s gross proﬁt generated by input use, while δei is the exter-
nality cost imposed by the ﬁrm onto itself. Similarly δe−i is the externality cost
imposed by other ﬁrms onto ﬁrm i. Given our speciﬁcations the dominant strat-
egy for ﬁrm i is to choose a level of input use that maximizes it’s proﬁt ignoring
therefore the externality imposed onto it by the activity of other ﬁrms (e−i) and
the externality imposed onto other ﬁrms by it’s own activity, i.e. (n−1)ei. The
ﬁrst order condition is :
f′(xi) − δ = 0, which gives b xi = f′−1(δ).
Since f′(.) > 0, b xi is unique and concavity of f(.) guarantees that proﬁt is
maximized.
Since ﬁrms are the only agents in the economy, under internal damage social
welfare (WI(.,.)) depends solely on ﬁrms’ proﬁts. We therefore deﬁne social











The optimum level of input use for each ﬁrm is deﬁned as the level that




order condition is :
f′(xi) − nδ = 0, i = 1,...,n,
i.e., at the social optimum, the level of input use by each ﬁrm is such that its
marginal beneﬁt equates the marginal social cost that it generates (nδ). Since
f(.) is strictly increasing the socially optimum level of input use for each ﬁrm is
given by x∗ = f′−1(nδ). By concavity of f(.), x∗ ≤ b x, leadings to an aggregate
level of emissions e∗ ≤ b e. Note that at the social optimum the aggregate level
of input use is equal to the level of ambient pollution e∗ = nx∗.
2.1.2 Collusion-proof ambient tax
In her seminal paper Segerson (1988) proposed an ambient based policy instru-
ment that combines a ﬁxed ﬁne and a tax/subsidy proportional to the diﬀerence




k + t(e − e◦) if e > e◦
s(e − e◦) if e ≤ e◦
￿
,
where t is the unit tax deducted if the level of emissions is above the target
level and s is a unit subsidy paid if the level of emissions is below the target. In
our setting it is natural to set the target level at the socially optimum emission
level : e◦ = e∗. Segerson (1988) considered the case where s = t. However such
a symmetric instrument may lead to over-abatement when the target level is the
socially optimum level of pollution as in our case. Indeed ﬁrms might tacitly
collude to reduce emissions below the threshold in order to be subsidized. To
avoid such an issue an asymmetric instrument is required. Obviously, setting
s = 0 provides the right incentives to meet the target. We consider a collusion-
free instrument that implements the ﬁrst best level of emissions e∗.
T(e) =
￿
t(e − e∗) if e > e∗
0 otherwise
￿
, with t = (n − 1)δ.
When the instrument T(e) is implemented ﬁrm i’s proﬁt becomes :
πi(xi,e,t) =
￿
f(xi) − δe − t(e − e∗) if e > e∗
f(xi) − δe otherwise
￿
Firm i maximizes it’s proﬁt by choosing a level of input use xi that satisﬁes
f′(xi)−δ −t = 0. The latter condition is equivalent to the ﬁrst order condition
for the socially optimum level of emissions whenever t = (n − 1)δ.
Let us now consider the case of external damage. To facilitate comparisons
we adopt the same presentation.
2.2 External damage
2.2.1 Ambient pollution under laissez-faire
Under external damage the externality of the polluting sector aﬀects only non-
polluters (for instance foreign ﬁrms or consumers) whereas polluting ﬁrms do
not suﬀer any damage. Firm i’s proﬁt πi(xi,e) is therefore not aﬀected by e,
the level of ambient pollution. Let us therefore rewrite ﬁrm i’s proﬁt function
as πi(xi,e) = hi(xi) with h′
i(.) > 0 and h′′
i (.) < 0. Social damage generated by
ambient pollution is now captured by a damage function D(e), with D′(.) > 0.
Under suitable restrictions the levels of individual emissions chosen under




hi(xi) = gi(xi), i = 1,...,n,
5The ﬁrst condition states that the external damage is equal to the internal
damage. The second condition states that the proﬁt function under external
damage is identical to the net proﬁt function under internal damage.
Given these assumptions, the social "internal" welfare function WI(x,e) and











Taking into account the fact that e =
n P
i=1
xi,the ﬁrst order condition for
maximizing W(x,e) is: h′
i(xi) − D′(e) = 0 ⇐⇒ h′
i(xi) = nδ
Social welfare is maximized whenever the marginal proﬁt of ﬁrm i is equal
to the marginal damage that it generates.
Under laissez-faire, each ﬁrm chooses a level of input use that maximizes it’s
proﬁt. Since hi(xi) = gi(xi), ﬁrm i chooses the same level of input under external
and under internal damage; i.e. a level of input use that does not account for
the negative externality.
2.2.2 Collusion-proof ambient tax
As in the case of internal damage, we consider a collusion-free instrument, that
is equivalent to the one introduced for the internal damage.
T(e) =
￿
t(e − e∗) if e > e∗
0 otherwise
￿
, with t = (n − 1)δ.
Firm i’s proﬁt when the instrument T(e) is implemented becomes :
hi(xi,e,t) =
￿
f(xi) − δe − t(e − e∗) if e > e∗
f(xi) − δe otherwise
￿
f′(xi) − δ − t = 0 which is equivalent to the ﬁrst order condition for the
socially optimum level of emissions whenever t = (n − 1)δ.
3 Experimental design
3.1 Practical speciﬁcations
In our experimental setting we chose the group size to be equal to 6 players as
in Spraggon (2002). Each player can choose a level of input in the strategy space
{0,1,...,30}. As we show below, given the speciﬁcation of the proﬁt function,
the dominant strategy both under external and internal damage is xi = 30 for
all i. Given the speciﬁcation of the proﬁt function the optimum level of input
use is x∗ = 20 as shown below.
6In order to simplify the instructions we chose a quadratic proﬁt function and
a linear externality cost under internal damage :
π(xi,e) = f(xi) − c(e) = −3x2
i + 192xi − 12e, with f(xi) = −3x2
i + 192xi
and c(e) = 12e. Note that with these parameters each player’s proﬁt function
is increasing1 and concave in xi, g(xi) = −3x2





xi, the individual proﬁt function can be rewritten as π(xi,e) =
−3x2
i + 180xi − 12e−i. It can be easily checked that the equilibrium input use
of ﬁrm i, is xi = 30. Given our speciﬁcation of the proﬁt function, the social












It is easy to check that the optimum input use of ﬁrm i, is x∗
i = 20 .
Under external damage the corresponding proﬁt function is h(xi) = 2700 −




hi(xi) − D(e) =
n P
i=1





The experiment was divided into two sequences : in sequence 1 subjects played
the emission game under laissez-faire for 10 successive rounds. In sequence 2
subjects played a second series of 10 rounds with the implementation of the am-
bient tax. We compare two treatments : internal damage and external damage.
Note that we did not control for possible order eﬀects, i.e. eﬀects due to the or-
dering of sequences 1 and 2. The reason is that our main objective is to compare
the eﬃciency of the ambient tax under two diﬀerent externality regimes when
the prevailing situation was the absence of regulation.
Subjects were recruited from a large subject pool of more than 2000 vol-
unteers. After their arrival at the experimental lab, subjects were randomly
assigned to a cubicle. In each session subjects were randomly assigned to a
group of 6 players, for the whole duration of the experiment. We collected 6 in-
dependent observations per treatment. Standard procedures were implemented :
anonymity, implementation of common knowledge of the instructions by public
reading, understanding check, .. The experiment was fully computerized and all
sessions were run under the same conditions. The average duration of a session
was approximately 1 hour and 30 minutes. Participants earned an average of 22
Euros including the show up fee. Further details can be found in the written
instructions (see appendix).
1In the absence of regulation, the proﬁt function increaes up to xi = 30 and decreases for
values larger than xi = 30 .
73.3 Performance indicators
As in Cochard et al. (2005) our analysis takes into account two indicators for
measuring the impact of the ambient tax : eﬃciency and reliability. Eﬃciency
measures how close the instrument reaches the target; reliability measures how
often the instrument reaches the target.
3.3.1 Eﬃciency
We measure eﬃciency in two diﬀerent ways. First we look at the average emission
per group. The ambient tax will be considered as eﬃcient if the average emission
of each group coincides with the target emission level which is equal to 120 units
with our speciﬁcations (6 × 20). In case of “laissez-faire” the predicted group
average emission (Nash equilibrium) is equal to 180 units (6 × 30).
Second we rely on the improvement (alteration) of social welfare after the
introduction of the ambient tax-instrument. Let us deﬁne W◦ and W∗the pre-
dicted levels of welfare under laissez-faire and at the social optimum respectively.
As in Spraggon (2002) we deﬁne the eﬃciency rate as :
E = W−W
◦
W ∗−W ◦ × 100
where W is the observed level of welfare. Note that E varies between 0%
and 100%, since the worst outcome is obtained at the Nash equilibrium under
laissez-faire.
3.3.2 Reliability
Eﬃciency alone is not suﬃcient to assess the performance of an instrument. Per-
formance depends also on the reliability of the instrument, i.e. it’s predictability:
if the same instrument is implemented under similar conditions we should expect
to observe the same outcome with respect to the level of eﬃciency. We measure
reliability, by the variability of the instrument’s eﬃciency (see Cochard et al.,
2005). The instrument’s variability can be captured in two diﬀerent ways : i)
by measuring the inter-periodic variability which reﬂects the variation of the
average eﬃciency of the groups between two consecutive periods and ii) by the
inter-group variability which measures the diﬀerence of the level of eﬃciency
between groups for every period.
3.3.3 Asymptotic values
Using averages can sometimes be misleading, in particular because averages put
the same weight on each period, neglecting the fact that subjects may learn as
the game is repeated. Therefore, it is important to assess the trend in input use
in order to ﬁnd out whether learning drives subjects towards the target level.
We therefore estimate asymptotic values using the following generic econometric
model (see Noussair et al., 1995).
8Zit = Z∞ + Z0 1
t + µi + εit
In the analyses that follow the independent variable Zit is either the level of
input use (Xit) or the level of eﬃciency (Eit ). i = 1,...,6 is the group index
and t = 1,...,10 the time index. µi is a normally distributed random variable
that captures the individual random eﬀect and εit is a standard random error
term. Z∞ is the estimated asymptotic value of the dependent variable (when t
tends to inﬁnity) and Z∞ + Z0 is the estimated value for period 1. A policy
instrument is preferable if it’s estimated asymptotic value gets closer to the
target value than other instrument.
4 Results
We present our ﬁndings according to three criteria: the level of emissions, the
level of welfare and reliability.
4.1 Emissions
We start with a general assessment of the ambient tax (result 1) before com-
paring the two externality regimes (result 2). We report our results ﬁrst with
respect to average emissions and second with respect to asymptotic emissions.
4.1.1 Average emissions
Result 1 : The ambient tax reduces sharply the level of emissions both under
internal and under external damage.
Support for result 1
Table 1 displays the average level of group emissions for the internal and
the external damage treatments, before and after implementation of the tax
instrument. The average emission in the laissez-faire sequence exceeds the av-
erage emission in the ambient tax sequence for each individual group in both
treatments. Therefore for both treatments the average group emission with
the ambient tax is signiﬁcantly lower than under laissez-faire (Wilcoxon signed-
rank test, two-sided, p = 0.027 for external damage and for internal damage).
It is noteworthy that under laissez-faire average group emissions are lower than
predicted (180 units) while in the ambient tax sequence they are above the tar-
get level (120 units). Under laissez-faire the average group emission is equal to
169 units under external damage and 170 units under internal damage, an in-
signiﬁcant diﬀerence (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, two-sided, p=0.8728), but
both are signiﬁcantly lower than predicted (t-test, one-sided, p=0.000 for both
treatments). In contrast in the ambient tax sequence average group emissions
are typically above the target level (120 units per group) averaging 124 under
external damage and 129 under internal damage. Both levels are signiﬁcantly
larger than predicted for both treatments (t-test, one-sided, p=0.000 for both
treatments), in line with earlier ﬁndings (Spraggon 2002, Cochard et al., 2005).
9( INSERT TABLE 1 AND FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE)
Result 2 : The ambient tax is equally eﬃcient for reducing emissions under
external damage than under internal damage.
Support for result 2
Average emissions are larger under internal damage (129 units) than under
external damage (124 units), but the null hypothesis of equal average group
emission under internal and external damage cannot be rejected (Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test, two-sided, p=0.1495). While the Wilcoxon Mann-Whithney
test does not reject the null hypothesis, there are nevertheless some marked dif-
ferences between the two treatments. Under external damage for three groups
out of six the average emission levels almost hit the target level (120 units).
Such outcome is never reached under internal damage. Also, ﬁgure 1 which re-
ports the evolution of the average level of group emission over time according to
the type of damage, clearly shows that the average emission curve for internal
damage is above the emission curve for external damage (in sequence 2 where
the tax is implemented). Finally, the null hypothesis of equal distributions of
group emissions is rejected for the ambient tax-sequence (Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test, p=0.000) but not for the laissez-faire sequence (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test,
p=0.928). These tests suggest that the ambient tax instrument is slightly more
eﬃcient for reaching the target emission level under external damage than under
internal damage.
4.1.2 Asymptotic emissions
Following the econometric model outlined in sub-section 3.3.3, we estimate
X∞ the asymptotic value of group emissions according to the model: Xit =
X∞ + X0 1
t + µi + εit. Table 2 reports the results of the model with random
eﬀects (Hausman test). In accordance with average emissions estimated as-
ymptotic group emissions in the laissez-faire sequences are lower than predicted
for both treatments. It looks as if subjects’ behavior mitigates to some extent
the externality problem. However the asymptotic group emission level is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the prediction under external damage (t-test, two-
sided, p=0.103) but is signiﬁcantly lower than predicted under internal damage
(t-test, one-sided, p=0.019). Figures 2(a) and 2(b) report the frequency distri-
butions of individual emissions under laissez-faire: 75% of subjects’ decisions
correspond to the level of emissions of 30 units under external damage and only
55% under internal damage, a non-signiﬁcant diﬀerence (Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test, p=0.635). The diﬀerence between the average and the estimated asymp-
totic values stems from the fact that group emissions tend to increase over time
suggesting that the level of average emission tends to converge to it’s equilibrium
value under laissez-faire.
(INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE)
10In the ambient tax sequence the asymptotic group emission is above the
equilibrium prediction for both treatments. The null hypothesis of equal asymp-
totic emission levels cannot be rejected (t-test, one-sided, p=0.1044 for external
damage and p=0.8585 for internal damage). A possible reason for the excess
level of group emissions under the ambient tax regime is that some subjects
anticipated wrongly that their group members would emit less than 20 units
and thus decided to choose a level of individual emission larger than 20 units.
The slight diﬀerence between average and asymptotic values stems from the
fact that group emission was constant over time. Figures 2(c) and 2(d) show
that only 35% of subjects’ decisions correspond to 20 units of emission under
external damage and 51% under internal damage, a non-signiﬁcant diﬀerence
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p=0.968).
(INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE)
4.2 Welfare
As for emissions, we measure the eﬃciency of the ambient tax under both
regimes by relating to average and asymptotic measures of welfare.
4.2.1 Average eﬃciency
Result 3 : The eﬃciency rate of the ambient tax does not signiﬁcantly diﬀer
between external and internal damage.
Support for result 3
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the eﬃciency rates over time according to the
type of damage. In the laissez-faire sequence the eﬃciency rate under internal
damage is above the eﬃciency rate under internal damage. No such diﬀerence
is apparent in the ambient tax sequence.
(INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE)
Table 3 reports the eﬃciency rates for each group before and after the im-
plementation of the ambient tax, for internal and external damage. Asymptotic
eﬃciency rates (estimated as described in section 4.2.2) are also reported in the
table. The average eﬃciency rate with the ambient tax is larger than without
for all groups and for both treatments (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, two-sided,
p=0.028 for external damage and for internal damage). The null hypothesis
of equal average eﬃciency rates for internal and external damage cannot be
rejected for both sequences (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, two-sided, p=0.631
for the laissez-faire sequence and p=0.521 for the ambient tax sequence).
The average eﬃciency rates under laissez-faire are low (12.04% under exter-
nal damage and 17.65% under internal damage) but signiﬁcantly larger than
11the predicted rate (0%) (t-test, one-sided, p=0.015 for external damage and
p=0.017 for internal damage). In contrast, the average eﬃciency rate with the
ambient tax (85.65% under external damage and 84.40% under internal dam-
age) is signiﬁcantly lower than the prediction (100%) for both treatments (t-test,
one-sided, p=0.038 for external damage and p=0.011 for internal damage).
(INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE)
An additional analysis of the impact of the ambient tax on the eﬃciency
rate is captured by the following regression Eit = θ+δD+ρS +υi +ϕit, where
Eit is the eﬃciency rate of group i in period t. D = 1 for external damage
(and 0 otherwise). S = 0 in periods where the tax is implemented. υi and ϕit
are random variables capturing idiosyncratic group eﬀects and random eﬀects,
respectively. Table 4 reports the results of random eﬀects model. As expected
the eﬀect of the ambient tax sequence is negative and signiﬁcant. The tax
increases signiﬁcantly the eﬃciency rate by about 70%. The type of damage
has no eﬀect on the eﬃciency rate. We therefore conclude that the eﬃciency
rate of the ambient tax does not depend on the type of damage according to
our experimental results.
(INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE)
4.2.2 Asymptotic eﬃciency
We estimate asymptotic eﬃciency based on the model introduced in subsection
3.3.3: Eit = E∞ + E0 1
t + µi + εit. Table 5 describes the results of a random
eﬀects model (Hausman test). Under laissez-faire the asymptotic eﬃciency is
low for both types of damages: about 11% for external damage and 15% for
internal damage, but signiﬁcantly higher than 0% in both treatments (t-test,
p=0.008 for external damage and p=0.021 for internal damage).
After the implementation of the ambient tax asymptotic asymptotic eﬃ-
ciency improved signiﬁcantly, reaching levels above 84% for both types of ex-
ternalities. The null hypothesis of equal asymptotic eﬃciency for both regimes
cannot be rejected (see table 6). However these values are signiﬁcantly lower
than 100% - the optimal eﬃciency level - for both treatments (t-test, one-sided,
p=0.018 for external damage and p=0.001 for internal damage).
(INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE)
(INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE)
4.3 Reliability
We now turn to our ﬁnal assessment by measuring the performance variability
both in absolute (emission variability) and relative terms (eﬃciency variability).
12Result 4 : There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence of reliability of the instrument
between internal and external damage.
Support of result 4
We provide support for result 4 in terms of emission variability and eﬃciency
variability.
4.3.1 Emission variability
Average emission variability Table 7 shows that the inter-periodic vari-
ability of average group emission2 is equal to 2.38% under internal damage and
3.31% under external damage before the ambient tax is implemented, an in-
signiﬁcant diﬀerence (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, two-sided, p = 0.631). Af-
ter implementation of the tax the average inter-periodic variability is equal to
2.31% and 2.16% for external and internal damage respectively, an insigniﬁcant
diﬀerence (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, two-sided, p = 0.262). Furthermore,
the Inter-periodic variability is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between the two se-
quences and for both treatments (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, two-sided, p =
0.600 for external damage and p = 0.345 for internal damage).
(INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE)
Figure 4 reports the inter-group variability of average emissions3 which is
equal to 5.7% under internal damage and 5.9% under external damage before
the application of the tax, an insigniﬁcant diﬀerence (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
test, two-sided, p=0.969). After the implementation of the tax the average inter-
group variability is equal to 7.16% and 6.51% for external and internal damage
respectively, an insigniﬁcant diﬀerence as well (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test,
two-sided, p=0.969). The Inter-group variability is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
between sequences for both treatments (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, two-sided,
p = 0.092 for external damage and p = 0.386 for internal damage). We therefore
conclude that reliability, as measured by emission variability is equal under both
ambient tax regimes.
(INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE)
Asymptotic emission variability Table 8 reports estimates of asymptotic
inter-period reliability indicators. Inter-periodic reliability in group i between
periods t and t- 1 is calculated by the absolute variation of eﬃciency between
these two periods: |∆Eit| = |Eit −Eit−1|. Before the implementation of the tax
the estimated asymptotic inter-periodic variability is 62% under internal damage

















13and -0.7% under external damage, a signiﬁcant diﬀerence (t-test, p=0.002).
After the implementation of the tax, the asymptotic values are close together,
and the diﬀerence is no longer signiﬁcant (t-test, p=0.986) conﬁrming our result
about average emission.
(INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE)
4.3.2 Eﬃciency variability
Average eﬃciency variability The ambient tax reduces sharply the vari-
ability of the average eﬃciency: from 22.80% to 3.58% in the case of external
damage, and from 32.16% to 7.56% in the case of internal damage (see table
9). While the eﬃciency gain is larger in the case of internal damage, the in-
strument’s reliability does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly between the two treatments
(Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, one-sided, p = 0.423).
Although the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant, there seems to be faster con-
vergence under external damage towards the socially optimum level of emis-
sions. The strategic interaction among players under internal damage might
have favoured opportunistic behavior preventing coordination on the eﬃcient
outcome.
(INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE)
Asymptotic eﬃciency variability Table 10 present the estimation of as-
ymptotic inter-group reliability indicators. Inter-group reliability is calculated
by the standard deviation between groups in period t: SGt = SG∞+SG0 1
t +εt
where t denote time (t=1, ..., 10), εt is an error term that follows an AR(1)
process εt = ρεt−1 + λt, where λt is an i.i.d. residual component.
As for the asymptotic emission variability, the instrument leads to a strong
reduction of variability in eﬃciency both under external and internal damage.
There is an insigniﬁcant diﬀerence between the two types of externalities (see
table 11).
(INSERT TABLE 10 and TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE)
5 Conclusion
The experiment reported in this paper was intended to compare the eﬃciency
and the reliability of the ambient tax in two radically diﬀerent contexts : one
where polluters do not bear any cost for their emissions and one where the pol-
luting ﬁrms generate a negative externality onto each other. These two contexts
are radically diﬀerent because, depending on the context, interacting players
may - or not - take into account their impact on others.Our experimental ﬁnd-
ings shows that the ambient tax is equally eﬃcient and reliable in both context.
This is an important result, since the ambient tax is often considered as an opti-
mal instrument for ambient pollution. Our results provide strong experimental
14support to this conjecture. Of course more evidence is required, in particular
experimental ﬁeld data. However given the results our artefactual lab experi-
ment, we conjecture that similar qualitative results will be obtained in a framed
ﬁeld experiment.
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